Q120, A2 — Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?
Objections
It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now _epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and _dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.
On the contrary
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_ is a kind of justice."
I answer that
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident. Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.
Replies to objections
_Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then _epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.
As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.
It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. _______________________ OF PIETY (In Two Articles) We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it? _______________________
Scripture references
Authorities mentioned
- Aristotle
Cross-references
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